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Two findings stand out in the literature on public attitudes vis-à-vis courts. The first is that 
judicial independence increases public trust. The second is that ‘to know courts is to love 
them.’  In this study, these stylized facts are used as a starting point to ask three questions. 
First, is there also a role for judicial accountability in fostering public trust, above and 
beyond that played by independence? Second, could it be that only the most aware citizens 
are sensitive to such properties of the judicial system? Third, is the notion that ‘to know 
courts is to love them’ limited to systems with high levels of judicial independence and 
accountability? Using recently available macro-level indicators of judicial independence 
and accountability and the high-quality survey data collected by the European Social 
Survey in RS countries throughout more than a decade, this study provides evidence that 
the answers to these questions are positive. 
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As Justice Frankfurter famously noted, in the absence of ‘sword’ and ‘purse’, the authority 
of courts ‘ultimately rests on sustained public confidence’. Such confidence is important 
to courts because they lack direct means of control over the implementation of their 
decisions or — in most cases — the direct popular legitimization that can arguably be 
provided by elections. Investment and trade are also more likely to flourish when a 
trustworthy system of dispute resolution, protection of property rights, and contract 
enforcement is in place (North UiiW). And in a age when courts have become the targets of 
populist leaders and movements that treat them as ‘elitist’ obstacles to the ‘will of the 
people’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser SWU`: UUa), their capacity to resist pressures towards 
increased majoritarianism or even illiberal forms of governance lies precisely on their 
ability to preserve strong public support (Arato SWUa: SSU).  
 
However, what makes judicial systems trustworthy in the eyes of the public? We answer 
this question by addressing three interrelated issues. First, one of the central claims in the 
scarce comparative empirical literature on this topic is that people’s trust in legal systems 
responds to specific ‘institutional qualities of the third power’ (Bühlmann and Kunz SWUU: 
RU_), particularly to judicial independence. However, as Ferejohn and Kramer put it, while 
independence allows judges and courts ‘freedom from certain foreseeable pressures to 
ignore the law (…), it also frees them from any pressure to follow it, and it allows them to 
make law in ways that could be problematic’ (SWWS: i`R). In other words, even if judicial 




Second, should all citizens be equally sensitive to the relevant institutional properties of 
judicial systems? As we discuss in greater detail later, public knowledge about judicial 
institutions is rather low in most countries on which data are available. Should we expect 
all citizens’ confidence in the legal system to be boosted equally or equivalently by the 
independence and/or accountability, or should we instead expect only those who are most 
aware and informed to react positively to such properties? Finally, a third interrelated 
question concerns the relationship between citizens’ legal awareness and their support for 
judicial systems. Research on support for high courts in the United States and several 
Western European countries suggests a simple message: ‘to know courts is to love them’ 
(Gibson et al. Uii_). However, is such regularity a universal truth or is it a function of the 
fact that it has been mostly investigated in contexts where judicial independence and 
accountability are comparatively high? What happens to the relationship between 
awareness and trust when we look at contexts where judiciaries are institutionally 
dependent and/or unaccountable?  
 
We address these questions by using high-quality survey data collected in RS European 
countries through the European Social Survey (ESS) for more than a decade, using a total 
of U`R surveys of nationally representative samples of national populations, totalling more 
than RWW,WWW respondents. These data are coupled with system-level measures of both de 
facto judicial independence (Linzer and Staton SWUZ; Staton et al. SWUi) and judicial 
accountability (Coppedge et al. SWUi; Pemstein et al. SWUi). As far as we know, this is 
vastest array of data ever compiled for a comparative empirical analysis of public attitudes 
vis-à-vis judicial systems. The study is structured as follows: in the next section, we present 
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our theoretical arguments about the importance of judicial independence, judicial 
accountability, and their interaction with political awareness in the explanation of trust in 
legal systems. In section three, we present the data employed, our analytical strategy, and 
our results. Section four concludes. 
Independence, Accountability, and Awareness 
Independence 
The concept of ‘judicial independence’ varies across disciplines and is the object of a vast 
literature assessing its different understandings (Zemans Uiii; Ferejohn SWWR; Levinson 
SWWa; Gardner Geyh SWUV). However, at its very core, judicial independence always 
requires institutions that shelter ‘the process of adjudication from interference by the 
political officials responsible for writing or enforcing law’ (Ferejohn and Kramer SWWS: 
ia`). By preventing such interference, ‘impartiality, fairness, and regularity in the 
interpretation and application of law’ are promoted (Ferejohn and Kramer SWWS: ia`).  
 
Understandably, courts that are independent also become more trustworthy in the eyes of 
citizens. As a vast socio-psychological literature has shown, impartiality and neutrality, 
core elements of procedural fairness in decision-making, increase citizens’ trust in and 
support for all kinds of authorities (Lind and Tyler Ui__; Grimes SWWa). Comparative 
research confirms the positive role played by judicial independence. This includes not only 
comparative studies of U.S. state courts (Benesh SWWa) but also several cross-national 
studies (Bühlmann and Kunz SWUU; Salzman and Ramsey SWUR; Çakır and Şekercioğlu SWUa; 
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Walker SWUa), showing that in contexts where de facto judicial independence is higher, 
individuals tend to have greater confidence in the judicial system.  
Accountability 
Desirable and trust-inducing as it may be, independence begs the question: ‘what do we do 
about lawless courts and irresponsible judging?’ (Ferejohn and Kramer SWWS: i`R). As 
Voigt (SWW_) puts it, although we want judges and courts to be independent, we also want 
them to be accountable, or to act in way that can be induced by accountability: ‘treat the 
parties appearing in front of them with respect, to separate relevant from irrelevant 
arguments, and to decide the case within a reasonable period of time according to the letter 
of the law’ (Voigt SWW_: i`).  
 
The potential tensions and trade-offs between independence and accountability are a 
perennial theme in legal and political theory. Although they can be seen as means towards 
the same end — a judicial process ‘in which decisions are made for appropriately legal 
sorts of reasons, without regard for considerations that law considers extraneous or 
immaterial’ (Ferejohn and Kramer SWWS: i`V) —, in practice, maximizing both goals is not 
always easy or even possible. Making use of the principal-agent model, Garoupa and 
Ginsburg (SWUZ) suggest that there is a potential trade-off between independence and 
accountability. On the one hand, extreme ‘accountability’ can hurt ‘judicial independence’ 
by subjugating the judiciary to the wishes and wills of guardians, including the electorate 
(the principal in their model). However, weak ‘accountability’ can transform ‘judicial 
independence’ into pure judicial self-government, failing to disincentivise judicial 
misconduct, unlawfulness, or inefficiency (thus serving the agent in their model). One clear 
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example of this potential trade-off is external judicial auditing, which enhances 
accountability (beyond mere assessment of backlogs and legal expertise) but opens the 
possibility for direct interference with the judiciary. 
 
Many qualitative, historical, and institutional studies have provided illustrations of the 
tension between independence and accountability, as Garoupa and Ginsburg (SWUZ) review. 
One such illustration is related to the consequences of the creation of judicial councils in 
some post-authoritarian systems in Europe. These councils are wholly or partially elected 
by judges among their peers, and put in charge of appointments, discipline, and promotions, 
with the goal of increasing the ‘external’ independence of judiciaries (Guarnieri SWWV). 
While awarding those tasks to such collegial bodies can deprive political actors of 
important means of coercion over judges (thus departing from the authoritarian past), it has 
also sometimes resulted in ‘the capture of the judicial council by the judiciary itself’ 
(Ginsburg and Garoupa SWWi: aS). By increasing ‘internal’ independence vis-à-vis higher-
ranking judges, judicial councils also have, in some cases, subverted the traditional 
hierarchical orders in many countries (Ginsburg and Garoupa SWWi: `a) and, by doing so, 
‘dismantled the traditional forms of assessment of judicial performance’ (Guarnieri SWUR: 
RZR). Cases such as Italy and several Eastern European countries have been used to 
illustrate this phenomenon,1 through which judicial independence without accountability 
can result, in practice, in a purely self-regulated judiciary, insulated from society, and 




However, in Garoupa and Ginsburg’s (SWUZ) model, the trade-off between accountability 
and independence is not necessarily universal and general: instead, it varies across time, 
jurisdictions and, particularly, different dimensions of independence and accountability. 
The compatibility between independence and accountability is made possible by the fact 
that both work at multiple dimensions (see also Bermant and Wheeler UiiV and  Burbank 
Uiii). Independence can be ‘personal/behavioural’ (judges are individually free of 
pressure), ‘collective or institutional’ (the judiciary as a whole is independent from 
pressures from other branches of government), ‘procedural’ (judges can adjust procedure 
in the courtroom as they see fit in order to assure procedural fairness) or ‘administrative’ 
(preventing court budgets, judicial salaries, or promotions from being politically 
regulated), with procedural and administrative potentially lumped together as ‘decisional’ 
independence (Gardner Geyh SWUV). Judicial accountability is also multidimensional, as 
when, for example, the judiciary as whole is accountable before other branches of 
government (collective/institutional) or when judges can be made accountable for 
individual misconduct and wrongdoing (personal/behavioural). This makes it possible, for 
example, that a high level of personal accountability of judges can virtuously coexist with 
a high level of institutional independence of the judiciary (Garoupa and Ginsburg SWUZ). 
 
This is perhaps the main reason why, when examining judicial independence and 
accountability, empirical studies have found that available indicators of both end up being 
positively (rather than negatively) correlated (Voigt SWW_: UW_). Furthermore, several 
positive outcomes have been shown to result from the maximization of some dimensions 
of both. Voigt (SWW_) shows that GDP per capita is positively related with both de facto 
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judicial independence and accountability. Voigt and Gutmman (SWUZ) show additional 
positive effects of accountability: systems where judicial decisions are published and 
require a higher level of legal justification on the part of judges are associated with lower 
levels of corruption both in the judiciary and in the public sector as a whole. These findings 
suggest that, in real world systems, independence and accountability can be intrinsically 
consistent and understood as virtuous and socially valued goals of the institutions that 
regulate judicial systems. However, the role of accountability in fostering public support 
has, as far as we know, never been comparatively examined. We therefore test a second 
hypothesis: the greater the level of judicial accountability, the more individuals should trust 
their legal system. 
Awareness 
Courts tend to be less visible or salient for people than the kind of elected political 
institutions whose public support is regularly gauged in public opinion studies. Knowledge 
of and attention to courts, criminal justice, sentencing, and judicial appointment and 
retention rules and practices is generally low in most countries on which we have data, 
including highly developed nations (Roberts and Stalans Uii_; Bowal and Wanke SWWU; 
Hough and Roberts Uiii; Mirrlees-Black SWUR).2 At the very least, people’s awareness — 
‘the extent to which an individual pays attention (…) and understands what he or she has 
encountered’ (Zaller UiiS: SU) — of the institutional properties and operation of judicial 
systems is likely to vary significantly. 
 
We expect such variations in awareness to interact with judicial independence and 
accountability in the explanation of trust in the judicial system for two main reasons. First, 
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awareness should moderate the relationship between the ‘institutional qualities of the third 
power’ — such as independence and accountability — and trust. People who have higher 
levels of attention and information are likely to be more sensitive than others to their legal 
system’s actual level of independence and accountability when forming an evaluation of 
that system. This expectation also follows from Garoupa and Ginsburg (SWUZ). Although 
they do not consider awareness, it inevitably plays a significant role in the context of the 
principal-agent model. In their model, independence and accountability emerge as 
mechanisms to regulate the relationship between the principal (the public more generally) 
and the agent (the judiciary). Hence, the extent to which the principal is aware of the agent 
matters for institutional arrangements. Unaware principals will remain oblivious to 
institutional choices, allowing agents to implement their preferred solutions to 
independence and accountability. 
 
Indeed, there is already some evidence that individuals’ response to contextual factors 
varies according to their level of awareness. For example, ‘the harmful effect of high levels 
of corruption on political trust (and to a lesser extent: the effect of macro-economic 
performance) is most prevalent among the higher educated’ (Van der Meer and 
Hakhverdian SWU`: i_). Even closer to the point, Wenzel et al. (SWWR) show that, in the 
United States, only among most educated citizens are levels of public confidence in state 
courts affected by judicial selection methods.  
 
Second, the system’s institutional properties should themselves moderate the relationship 
between awareness and trust. One well-known regularity in the study of the relationship 
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between citizens’ awareness and their attitudes towards courts is that, at least for the U.S. 
and some European cases, ‘those who know more about courts are more likely to support 
them’ (Gibson SWW`: ZUa). The main argument is that such awareness also means exposure 
to messages and symbols that convey a fundamental message: courts are different from 
ordinary political institutions, and thus ‘worthy of more respect, deference, and obedience’ 
(Gibson SWW`: ZUa; Gibson et al. SWUV: _VW).  
 
However, what happens when awareness means exposure to a different message, one whose 
content instead conveys the notion that courts and judges lack independence and/or are 
unaccountable? Several studies have shown that, as we expand the scope of analysis 
beyond the contexts of the U.S. and Western Europe, awareness appears to be unrelated to 
trust (Bühlmann and Kunz SWUU; Driscoll and Nelson SWU_), or even negatively related to it 
(Salzman and Ramsay SWUR; Boateng and Adjorlolo SWUi). Even closer to the point, Çakır 
and Şekercioğlu (SWUa) show that the relationship between what they call ‘political 
awareness’ and confidence in courts is not uniform across countries, depending on how 
democratic they are. In other studies of political trust, a similar phenomenon emerges: the 
positive relationship between one’s level of education with trust is only present in contexts 
of low corruption, and dissipates or even becomes negative when corruption is high 
(Hakhverdian and Mayne SWUS; Agerberg SWU_). Thus, we expect that, under systems with 
vigorous judicial independence and accountability, greater awareness should correlate 
positively with trust in the judiciary, but when those properties are absent, more aware 




In sum, our discussion of the relationship between independence, accountability, 
awareness, and trust in the legal system suggests four main hypotheses: 
 
HU: The greater the level of de facto judicial independence, the more individuals should 
trust their legal system. 
 
HS: The greater the level of judicial accountability, the more individuals should trust their 
legal system. 
 
HR: The relationships between independence and accountability and trust in the legal 
system should be stronger for individuals with greater levels of political awareness. 
 
HV: The relationship between awareness and trust in the legal system should be positive 
when levels of independence and accountability are high, but negative when levels of 
independence and accountability are low. 
 
Data, analysis, and results 
Individual-level data 
To capture individuals’ Trust in the legal system, we resort to the European Social Survey 
(ESS). Each respondent, in each wave of the ESS in every country, has been asked to rate 
the level of trust she deposits in her country’s legal system, on a scale of W (‘No trust at 
all’) to UW (‘A lot of trust’). We used the data of the ESS rounds U to `, a vast pooled 
cumulative dataset from all countries that have been included in the integrated ESS files in 
two or more rounds (ESS SWUa). Overall, this dataset contains RRU,_`U individual-level 
observations, resulting from a total of U`R surveys of nationally representative samples of 
populations with UZ years of age or more, conducted in RS European countries during UV 





The nature of ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ when applied to the study of support for courts has 
been exhaustively examined in the American literature. ‘Trust’ is conceptually and 
empirically distinct from ‘legitimacy’ or ‘diffuse support,’ reflecting instead a ‘holistic 
judgment about institutional performance’ (Gibson et al. SWWR: RaU). Such judgments about 
the judicial system seem to be strongly driven by more general attitudes towards 
governmental institutions (Stoutenborough and Haider-Markel SWW_; Hansen SWU`; 
Ansolabehere and White forthcoming). In order to isolate the empirical relationship 
between the institutional properties of the judicial system and people’s trust in it from other 
processes that might be driving support for governmental institutions as a whole, we follow 
Bühlmann and Kunz (SWUU) and control for Trust in parliament, also measured on a W to UW 
scale in all ESS rounds. This is a particularly stringent control, given that questions 
employed to measure trust in different objects (including the legal system and parliament) 
in the ESS are always posed in a block of immediately adjacent items, causing responses 
to each item to be affected by the proximity of the remaining ones in a way that favours 
inter-item correlation (Weijters et al. SWWi).  
 
Measuring awareness poses a different challenge. Ideally, following Zaller (UiiS), one 
would be able to resort to measures about respondents’ factual knowledge of the way their 
judicial system works, particularly, in our case, of institutions and practices that directly 
impinge on judicial independence and accountability (like in, for example, Gibson and 
Caldeira SWWi). However, such measures are unavailable in the ESS, as in other large-scale 
cross-national surveys. Thus, we rely on commonly used proxies that are available in all 
waves of the ESS. One of them is Education, which is measured as the respondents’ number 
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of years of full-time education (top-coded at SZ years). The other is News media exposure, 
the responses to a question about the average number of hours spent watching news on 
politics and current affairs on TV, in an ordinal _-point scale ranging from ‘No time at all’ 
(W) to ‘More than R hours’ (`).4  
 
To be sure, although formal education is necessary to acquire the cognitive skills required 
to develop a greater awareness of the legal system, it is not a sufficient pre-condition, as it 
does not guarantee the required motivation to seek such information  (Zaller UiiS: RRV). 
Furthermore, we know that formal education is also positively correlated with the espousal 
of attitudes and values that emphasize liberal dimensions of democracy (Welzel SWUU), 
including, presumably, judicial independence. Conversely, media exposure to news, 
although a pre-condition to the acquisition of knowledge about political and legal 
institutions, is also too rough a measure: it fails to distinguish between exposure to different 
types of media outlets and relies on self-reported exposure and the associated biases (but 
see Linos and Twist SWUa for how measures of “knowledge” can also be biased by prior 
beliefs). In any case, we will return to some of the implications of the use of these proxies 
when discussing the empirical results. 
 
Individual-level control variables include Female (a dummy variable), the Age of the 
respondent (in years), and Interpersonal trust (the regression-based factor scores based on 
the three relevant variables in the ESS), variables that other studies have found to be a 




Our two main macro-level independent variables are measured for each country and every 
year in which the EES surveys were conducted. To capture judicial independence, we 
borrow from the results of a dynamic bounded graded item response theory model 
developed by Linzer and Staton (SWUZ), which generates a cross-national measure of latent 
de facto judicial independence (Latent Judicial Independence - LJI), incorporating data 
from eight manifest variables directly or indirectly capturing de facto judicial 
independence.5 Besides overcoming problems of missing data on one or another indicator 
for several countries or years, LJI has the major advantage of minimizing measurement 
error, avoiding both excessive and insufficient sensitivity to contextual changes. Values of 
LJI range from W to U, from very low to very high de facto judicial independence, and are 
available for a maximum of U`U countries from UiV_ until SWUZ (Staton et al. SWUi). The 
higher the value, the more judges in a given context can expect to be able to decide 
autonomously and expect such decisions to be implemented without interference (Linzer 
and Staton SWUZ: SSZ).  
 
Judicial Accountability (JA) is obtained from the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) dataset 
(Coppedge et al. SWUi; Pemstein et al. SWUi). It results from ratings of country experts in 
response to the following question: ‘when judges are found responsible for serious 
misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?,’ using 
an ordinal scale of W (‘never’) to V (‘always’), converted to a roughly normalized interval 
scale by the measurement model. In other words, the higher the value, the more judges are 
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held personally responsible for misconduct in a given system, pointing, as discussed earlier, 
to a dimension of personal/behavioural judicial accountability. 
 
In our sample of cases — U`R country-years — LJI ranges from .RSZ to .iiU, with an average 
of ._ZU and a standard deviation of  .Ua`. JA ranges from -U.ZRi to R.aRV, with an average of 
U.`S and a standard deviation of U.UR. Importantly, the two variables are highly correlated in 
our sample of ESS countries, at ._W. This has two implications. On the one hand, it confirms 
the compatibility of independence and accountability in real world systems and across 
countries, at least when measured in their respective institutional (independence) and 
personal/behavioural (accountability) dimensions. On the other hand, high correlation 
between these measures will tend to increase the variance of the estimates of their 
parameters when regressing trust on them, decreasing precision in the estimation of the 
partial effects of independence and accountability, and thus the likelihood that null 
hypotheses about them can be rejected (Kennedy SWW_: UiR-UiV). Nevertheless, we will 
assess the implications of this correlation between our two main variables by examining 
the sensitivity of the estimates to their joint presence in the models and the presence and 
absence of other predictors. Furthermore, one should recall that, if we are still able to reject 
null hypotheses about the effects of either independence or accountability in the presence 
of a high correlation between the two variables, this supports — rather than detracts from 
— their relevance as independent predictors. 
 
Bühlmann and Kunz (SWUU) also found that confidence in the judicial system tends to be 
higher for people living in countries with larger populations and greater GDP per capita, 
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with opposite results for contexts where common law systems prevail (SWUU: RSi). Thus, as 
controls, we add Population (the log of population in millions), GDP per capita (logged) 
and a dummy for UK common law legal origins (taken from La Porta et al. SWW_). 
Furthermore, in one of the specifications, we employ country- and survey year-fixed 
effects. 
Analysis and results 
We start by presenting simple bivariate patterns of the relationship between Latent Judicial 
Independence and Judicial Accountability, on the one hand, and Trust in the legal system, 
on the other. Figure U shows two scatterplots: on the left, the sample averages of Trust in 
the legal system in all ESS surveys are plotted against the respective country-year values 
of LJI for all our observations; on the right, the same, but in this case against country-year 
values of Judicial Accountability. Clearly, in countries where judicial independence and 
judicial accountability are higher, trust in the legal system also tends to be higher. 
 
Figure U. Latent Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability (horizontal axes) and Trust in 































































In order to take our analysis further, employing multivariate analyses combining 
individual- and macro-level observations, we need to consider that our data is composed 
by measurements of survey respondents in different countries and different years. In order 
to take into account the nested nature of the data, we employ multilevel models. In this 
case, individuals are nested in two higher-level contexts — country and survey year — but 
these two contexts are not nested among themselves. Instead, respondents are nested within 
the cells of a cross-classification of countries by years. Thus, we estimate cross-classified 
multilevel linear regression models, which specify between-country and between-survey 
year variances and estimate variance at the year level while assuming that variance is equal 
across countries and vice versa (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal SWUS: VRR-VVU).  
 
To test HU and HS, we regress trust on LJI and JA, entering them separately (models U and 
S) and jointly (model R), first with macro-level controls, and then with both macro- and 







Table '. Judicial independence (LJI) and judicial accountability (JA) as correlates of trust in legal systems: multilevel cross-classified random 
intercept model. 
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N observations CBB,BK' CBB,BK' CBB,BK' C'',DEP C'',DEP C'',DEP 
N countries CB CB CB CB CB CB 
N country-years 'PC 'PC 'PC 'PC 'PC 'PC 
Variance components          
Country .PC .EM .FM .CB .CF .C' 
Year .KC .KD .KD .K' .K' .K' 
Individuals E.MK E.MK E.MK C.PD C.PD C.PD 
Notes. Intercept not shown, standard errors in parentheses. +p < K.'; *p < K.KE; **p < K.K'; ***p < K.KK'. 
	
First, people living under judicial systems where independence and accountability are 
higher tend to lend greater trust to their legal system. The coefficients of LJI and JA are 
unaffected by their joint or separate inclusion in the models, and are always significant at 
least at p=.AAB, regardless of model specification. This supports HB and HD.  
 
Second, the coefficients experience sizeable drops in size when individual-level controls 
are included. In models I to J, the most powerful predictor of trust in the legal system is 
Trust in parliament: a one standard deviation increase in the latter is estimated to result in 
an increase of more than half a standard deviation in Trust in the legal system. This suggests 
that both judicial independence and judicial accountability are likely to be a part of a 
broader institutional configuration of domestic institutions — what Voigt calls 
‘institutional quality’ at large (Voigt DAAS: BAT) — that foster political trust in general. 
Consequently, once trust in parliament is introduced as a control, the specific institutional 
properties of the judicial system emerge with a smaller independent relationship with 
public trust in the legal system. However, considering the above mentioned 
conservativeness in the estimates that results from introducing Trust in parliament, the fact 
that those properties of the judicial system remain significant correlates of Trust in the legal 
system is encouraging.  
 
Finally, judicial independence is a much stronger correlate of trust in the legal system than 
judicial accountability, in all specifications. Before individual-level controls are introduced 
(Model Y), a one standard deviation increase in LJI is estimated to increase Trust in the 
legal system by .ZZ, about B/Z of a standard deviation in the dependent, while the equivalent 
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change in JA is estimated to increase trust by .YY. In Model J, these effects drop, 
respectively, to .YB and .AJ. While the former is equivalent, for example, to the relationship 
between Interpersonal trust and Trust in the legal system, the latter is much smaller. In 
other words, citizens’ trust in the legal system seems to be more sensitive to the presence 
of institutions that guarantee de facto independence of courts than to those that foster 
personal accountability of judges for misconduct. 
 
However, these are main effects, and we still need to consider HY and HI. HY proposed that 
the effects of independence and accountability should be contingent upon citizens’ 
awareness, while the latter proposed that the effects of awareness should be contingent 
upon independence and accountability. Table D includes results for two types of multilevel 
cross-classified models. The first introduces cross-level interactions between two of our 
upper-level variables (LJI and JA) and, in alternation, our two proxies for awareness: Years 
of education and News media exposure. Following best practice, to minimize overrejection 
of the null hypothesis of no cross-interaction effect, we adopt the conservative approach of 
including random slopes for our measures of awareness, the lower-level component of 
those cross-level interactions (Heisig and Schaeffer DABT). The second type of model, 
preserving random-slopes for awareness, corrects for the non-independence of 
observations within countries and years by adding fixed effects for countries and survey 
years, taking advantage of the fact that our total number of country-year observations of 
LJI and JA is larger than the number of fixed effects in the model (see Paskov et al. DAB` 
for a similar approach). 
Table '. Cross-level interactions between independence, accountability and awareness: random slope models (< and =) and random slope models 
with country and survey-year fixed effects (B and CD). 
 Random slope models Random slope and country and survey year fixed effects models 
 Model <: years of education Model =: news exposure Model B: years of education Model CD: news exposure  
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N observations NCC,OL< NCD,OPC NCC,OL< NCD,OPC 
N countries N' N' N' N' 
N country-years C<N C<N C<N C<N 
Variance components         
Country .NP .'= - - 
Year .DC .DC - - 
Country-year - - .DN .DN 
Individuals N.<N N.<O N.<D N.<D 
Awareness .DD .DD .DD .DD 
Notes. Intercept not shown, standard errors in parentheses. +p < D.C; *p < D.DL; **p < D.DC; ***p < D.DDC.  
First, of the eight cross-level interaction coefficients estimated, only three are statistically 
significant at p<.9:, and four if we relax to p<.:9. Two (in models @ and A) pertain to 
Judicial independence*Years of full-time education, and the other two (in models D and :9) 
to Judicial accountability*News media exposure. In other words, judicial independence 
and judicial accountability do show significant interactions with Awareness, although 
through different proxies.  
In Figure H, we present marginal effects plots for Judicial Independence and Judicial 
Accountability, showing how the estimated effect of both varies with, respectively, Years 
of full-time education and News media exposure. Furthermore, following Berry, Golder, 
and Milton (H9:H), given that we had also hypothesized that the effects of Awareness on 
trust should be contingent upon the institutional properties of the judicial system, in Figure 
M we present marginal effects plots for Years of full-time education and News media 
exposure, showing how their effects vary with, respectively, Judicial Independence and 
Judicial Accountability. 
On the left side of Figure H, we look at the marginal effects of judicial independence 
conditional on years of education (random slope model above, random slope with fixed 
effects below), while, on the right, at the marginal effects of judicial accountability 
conditional on news media exposure (random slope models above, random slope with fixed 









Figure H. The marginal effects of Latent Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability on 
Trust in the legal system, conditional on, respectively, education and news media exposure. 
	
 
The respondents’ level of education moderates the relationship between judicial 
independence and their trust in the judicial system: the higher the number of years of full-
time of education of the respondent, the stronger the (positive) effect of independence. In 
model @, the effect of LJI is positive and increases with education. In Model A, the effect 
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greater exposure to the educational system. However, we must recall that, in the case of 
Model A, we are introducing country and survey-years fixed effects, which dampens the 
effect of any slow moving institutional variable, as LJI clearly is among our countries.  
 
Conversely, on the right, the relationship between judicial accountability and people’s trust 
in the judicial system emerges as contingent upon the respondents’ exposure to news in the 
media. At the lowest levels of exposure, the results are compatible with judicial 
accountability having no relationship with trust in the legal system. However, as exposure 
increases, the relationship becomes positive (albeit much smaller than the relationship 
between independence and trust for the highly educated). In general, therefore, the results 










Figure M. The marginal effects of Years of full-time education and News media exposure on Trust 




In Figure M, we switch our focus to the extent to which the relationship between awareness 
and trust is moderated by judicial independence and accountability. On the left side, we 
can see that, as we move from cases with low de facto independence (in our sample of 
cases, countries like Ukraine or Russia) to high levels (in countries like Denmark, 

































































































































































































trust indeed switches from negative to positive. Although the estimates of the random slope 
model (Model @) are less precise than those resulting from the random slope/country and 
survey years fixed effects model (Model A), the pattern is the same.  
 
Evidence supporting He is slimmer in what concerns the way judicial accountability 
modifies the effects of news media exposure. On the basis of Model A, that relationship is 
negative in contexts of low judicial accountability (such as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, or Italy), and compatible with zero (rather than positive) at the highest levels of 
JA (in countries like Austria, Germany, or Denmark). But on the basis of Model D, it is 
unclear whether awareness captured by the ‘media exposure’ proxy has any relationship 
with trust in the legal system. Overall, there is weaker support for He, at least in what 
concerns judicial accountability.7 
Conclusion 
Using a vast array of data on trust in the legal system, judicial independence, and judicial 
accountability in more than M9 European countries over more than a decade, we found that, 
above and beyond support for governmental institutions in general, people’s trust in their 
judicial systems is positively related with fundamental institutional properties of those 
systems: judicial independence and judicial accountability. Furthermore, those properties 
matter most for particular profiles of respondents. Those who are more educated are also 
more sensitive in their evaluations of the legal system to the extent the judiciary in their 
countries is independent. Conversely, whether the legal system favours the accountability 
of judges for misconduct tends to matter only for those with the most exposure to 
information through the news media (although support for this finding is not robust to 
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model specification). Finally, we saw that there are gaps in trust between individuals based 
on different levels of education and news media exposure. Under conditions of low 
independence, the less educated tend to place greater trust in the legal system than those 
who are more educated, but in contexts of high judicial independence this gap is reversed. 
The evidence is less clear-cut when the relevant contextual variable is accountability. 
However, using the multilevel country- and year-fixed effects specification, under 
conditions of low accountability, those who are more exposed to the news media are less 
likely to trust the system than those who are least exposed. Under high accountability, that 
gap disappears. 
 
These findings are broadly consistent with a principal-agent theory of judicial 
independence and accountability (Garoupa and Ginsburg H9:h). They also have important 
implications. On the one hand, combining independence and accountability, at least in the 
dimensions we were able to examine — respectively, collective/institutional and 
personal/behavioural — seems not only possible but also desirable from the point of view 
of fostering public confidence in the courts. In other words, agitating the flag of ‘threats to 
judicial independence’ whenever measures aimed at improving personal accountability of 
judges are discussed involves not only an incomplete conceptualization of both concepts 
but also a potentially lost opportunity to increase public confidence.  
 
However, in no way do our findings suggest that opting for enhancing accountability is 
more appropriate or more effective in fostering public trust than increasing de facto 
independence. In fact, it is quite the contrary, given the difference in effect sizes of these 
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two institutional properties. To be sure, in several post-authoritarian European systems, 
judicial independence seems to have been achieved by means of institutions and practices 
that seem to have created an accountability problem: ‘an impregnable force-field that 
prevents judges from being accountable for the quality and integrity of their judicial work’ 
(Moliterno et al. H9:D). However, we should also keep in mind that in many real world 
cases of political proposals intending to curb what is often described as ‘excessive 
independence’ in order to ‘increase judicial accountability’ are often ill-disguised ‘attempts 
by political leaders to control the courts (…) couched in accountability terms, while in 
practice operating as instruments of political control’ (Zoll and Wortham H9:D: D@D). Our 
results suggest that increasing the personal accountability of judges at the (unnecessary) 
expense of the collective independence of courts seems to be a certain path to undermining 
the public’s trust in the system. 
 
The results also suggest new and expanded avenues of inquiry. First, the empirical 
compatibility between independence and accountability in fostering trust resulted from 
from a conceptualization and measurement of accountability that focuses on its 
personal/behavioural dimension. However, other dimensions of accountability, particularly 
those that are ‘collective or institutional’ in nature, might not prove so compatible with 
independence in fostering high levels of trust.  
 
Second, exploring further the interaction between citizens’ awareness and the institutional 
properties of judicial systems is a path for further research that requires overcoming the 
kind of data limitations we faced. Neither education nor exposure to the news media are 
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ideal measures of awareness. In particular, although the results we obtained are compatible 
with the notion that people who know more about the judicial system are more likely to be 
sensitive to its properties, they are also compatible, in what concerns the role of education, 
with the notion that people who care more about independence are more sensitive to that 
property (Hakhverdian and Mayne H9:H: @MA). Measures of both legal awareness and 
democratic values, which would help us to distinguish between the ‘accuracy-inducing’ 
and the ‘norm-inducing’ roles of education, were unavailable in our surveys. Similarly, 
although exposure to news media in television does signal an information-seeking 
behaviour, it is also an imperfect measure of awareness, since the latter also depends on 
media contents and the way citizens process them. 
 
Finally, important as it may be, ‘trust’ is not the same as ‘legitimacy’. Although strong, 
effective, and independent judiciaries have often been seen as bulwarks against democratic 
backsliding (Gibler and Randazzo H9::), it is clear today that, in many countries and 
contexts — Hungary or Poland today, as before in Argentina, India, Peru, or Venezuela — 
courts themselves have become the primary targets of populist leaders and movements 
(Arato H9:A). To the extent that popular support for judiciaries is one of the ultimate lines 
of defence against such political attacks (Arato H9:r), understanding such support will 
require us to go beyond the kind of evaluations of institutional performance represented by 
‘trust’ and to collect and examine measures of deeper institutional loyalty on the part of 
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1 In Italy, such increased insulation has also led to professional breaches of competence and offenses being, 
for decades, routinely ignored, while civil liability mechanisms were rendered ineffective by both omission 
and commission on the part of judges themselves (Benvenuti H9:D). Similarly, in Eastern Europe, the 
dismantling of mechanisms of political control inherited from the Communist regimes led to widely divergent 
outcomes in terms of ensuring the accountability of judges in countries such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Poland, or Romania (Parau H99A; Popova H9:H; Kosař H9:r).  
2 Nevertheless, for some high courts (Gibson et al. 1998; Gibson and Caldeira 2009), the assumption of 
widespread public ignorance can also be misguided.  
3 See Online Appendix for information about all variables employed.   
4 TV exposure, rather than newspaper or radio exposure to news, was the only question of the sort posed in 
all ESS:-@ surveys. 
5 All these eight measures are based either on expert or official assessments (for most cases) and, in one of 
them, on business community surveys. For a detailed discussion, see Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2012) and 
Linzer and Staton (2015).  
6 We employed the marhis Stata module conceived by Hernández (H9:r). 
7 An additional indication is the fact that, in relation to reduced versions of models 8 and 10 (without the 
interaction term between LJI and JI and News media exposure), we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is 
no significant difference between models 8 and 10 and those reduced versions (using LR tests). We thank 


































Online appendix for Public Trust in the European Legal Systems: 
Independence, Accountability, and Awareness 
	
c. Data for replication and sources 
 




a. Individual level data 
 
European Social Survey Cumulative File: Stata file ESS:-@e9:.dta. 
Available from https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/, ESS’s 
cumulative data wizard.  




b. Contextual data.  
 
* Latent Judicial Independence (LJI): from Linzer and Staton (H9:h) and Staton, Linzer, 




*Judicial Accountability (JA): from Coppedge et al. H9:A; Pemstein et al. H9:A. Available 
at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-D/  
 




* GDP per capita (GDPpccH9::US): GDP per capita PPP, constant US H9:: international 
dollars, obtained from: 
http://api.worldbank.org/.H/en/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?downloadformat=excel. 
 
* Common law legal origin (legor_uk): British/common law legal origin, obtained from 












H. Required code: 
 
* New_variables_independence_accountabilty_awareness.do: Stata do file that adds all 
contextual variables, logarithmic transformations for population and GDP per capita, 
country, country year, year identifiers, and creates new independent and dependent 
individual level variables with NS/NR as missing and a new individual level variable: 
Interpersonal trust (interptrust), regression-based factor scores based on ppltrst, pplfair, 
and pplhlp. 
 
* Analysis_independence_accountability_awareness.do: Stata .do file that produces 
results for all tables and estimates models D and :9 without interaction terms and 
performs LR tests. 
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Table A:. Individual-level variables employed 
Variable Observations Mean Stddev Source: ESS :-@ cumulative file. Available at: 
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/. 
Trust in the 
legal system 
MHH,H9: h.9M H.@: Original variable: trstlgl, 9-:9. 
Female MM:,heD .he .h9 Original variable: gndr, 9 Male, : Female. 
Age MM9,Mee e@.@A :D.hA Original variable: agea, age in years. 
Years full-
time education 




MHr,r9h .99 .De Regression-based factor scores based on original variables ppltrst, pplfair 
and pplhlp (“Most people can be trusted”, “Most people try to be fair”, 
“Most of the time people helpful”), all 9-:9 
Trust in 
parliament 
M:@,9HM .99 .DD Original variable: trstprl, 9-:9 
Exposure to 
news (TV) 
MM9,hMh :.DA :.M@ Original variable: tvpol, :-D. 
 
 
Table AH. Country-year variables employed 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation 
Latent Judicial Independence :@M .Dh .:@ 
Judicial Accountability :@M :.@H :.:M 
GDP per capita (thousands) :@M Me.AAh :M.M9@ 
Common law origin :@M .:M .Me 
Population :@M HM.H@ HA.DM 
 
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
